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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, by 
RICHARD TANGREN, Trustee and 
RICHARD TANGREN, Individually, ; 
Appellee/Plaintiff 
V 1 
RODNEY TANGREN ] 
Appellant ) 
i Appellate Case No. 20050085 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order of an order from the Seventh District Judicial District, 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to the provisions provided in UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)GX2001), as amended. 
CONSTTrUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in finding that the Lease, as defined herein, was 
invalid? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An "appellate court reviews the trial courfs findings of 
fact for clear error, reversing only where a finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.** 
Ellison v. Stem 2006 UT App 150, J17, - P.3d - . UT. R. APP. P. 24(aX9) states that "[a] 
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party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Recently, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[m]arshaling evidence in 
support of the ultimate finding is a prerequisite to a challenge to it." Parduhn v. Bennett 
2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495. The Utah Supreme Court has also held that "[a] party must 
marshal all of the evidence supportive of the verdict in its opening brief." Harding v. Bell. 
2002 UT 108,57 P.3d 1093. 
ISSUE II: Didthe trial court err in concluding that the Lease, as defined herein, was 
invalid? 
STANDARD OF REVBEW: Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and 
reviewed de novo. Southern Title Guaranty Co. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d951 (Utah App. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 29,2006, Richard Tangren, and the Tangren Family Trust, by and through 
Richard Tangren as trustee (collectively, the "Appellee") filed his Complaint against his son, 
Rodney Tangren (herein after "Appellant") alleging that the Appellant had violated terms 
of the lease agreement dated February 24,2004 (hereinafter, the "Lease"). R002-R019. On 
June 13,2002, Appellant filed his Answer and Counterclaim to the Appellee's Complaint, 
alleging that he had lawful possession of the property at issue as a lessee. R022-R028. 
Appellant claimed that he had lawful possession of the property as a lessee and that Appellee 
had trespassed to real property. R025 at ffl[5-10. 
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On July 11,2002, Appellee filed an Answer to the Appellant's Counterclaim. R029-
R030. On July 22,2002, upon completion of the parties' planning conference, the Rule 26(f) 
Planning Conference Repot and Stipulation was filed with the Seventh Judicial District 
Court It outlined discovery dates, how discovery should be conducted, and other important 
factors under Rule 26(f). R031-R033. On Jury 29, 2002, Appellee filed his initial 
disclosures. R039-R041. On September 11, 2002, Appellee filed his initial disclosures. 
R042-R043. The parties then proceeded to file interrogatories and answers in mis matter. 
R044-R047. 
On November 8,2004, the Appellee filed the AmendedComplaint, clarifying that the 
Lease drafted in 1994 did not form a valid contract between the parties. The Amended 
Complaint specifically indicated mat the Lease was drafted to be used only where 
Appellant's siblings took action against Appellee or the subject properties in an effort to gain 
an interest therein. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint indicated that the property was 
men valued at two million ($2,000,000.00) dollars. The Amended Complaint indicated that, 
considering the value of the property, the rent payment set forth in the Lease of $150 per 
month was unconscionable, and therefore void. The Amended Complaint additionally 
alleged that the parties had not ever treated the Lease as a valid lease agreement R075 at 
132(a)-(d). 
On November 15,2004, Appellant filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim in 
which he added two affirmative defenses to his counterclaim. R092-R101. The Amended 
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Answer and Counterclaim added the fourth cause of action, which was Fraud, and a fifth 
cause of action, which was Negligent Misrepresentation. R098-R099. 
On August 25,2004, and November 17 and 18,2004, the allegations contained in the 
Amended Complaint and the Amended Answer and Counterclaim came for trial before 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan 
County, State of Utah. R127-R134. At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the trial 
court found the Lease to be invalid and, thus, no award was granted to either the Appellant 
or the Appellee at that time. Id The parties were instructed to pay their own attorneys fees 
and costs in this matter. Id. On January 12,2005, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact 
andOrder (the "Order"). R127-R134. A copy ofthe Order is attached hereto as Addendum 
"A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
On January 19, 2005, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal from the Order. R138-
R139. OnMarch 17,2006, Appellant filed his opening briefchallenging(l) whether the trial 
court erred "with regard to its statement of legal principles governing the construction 
interpretation of lease agreements and associated issues raised by the Counterclaim in this 
case;" (2) whether the trail court erred in concluding that the Lease Agreement was invalid, 
based upon parol evidence testimony as to the intent of the parties that contradicted the 
explicit terms ofthe written Lease Agreement;" and (3) whether the trial court failed "to 
make adequate findings of fact upon which the Order ofthe trial court could be based." See, 
Appellant's Brief at pp. 1-2. 
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STATBMEINT PF FACTS 
In the early 1950s, with the encouragement and help from his brother, Appellee 
purchased some land known as the Anderson Bottom, together with some cattle, from Ralph 
Miller. Appellee purchased the cattle and his brother purchased the land, and together they 
ran a cattle business for many years. Tr. Vol. I1 at p. 15. Some years later, the federal 
government and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") decided to make a national park 
and Appellee and his brother were forced from Anderson Bottom. Appellee still had two 
hundred and fifty head of cattle, however, so it was imperative that he locate and purchase 
other property. Appellee relocated to land on the Colorado River (the "Colorado River 
Land"), which he purchased from State Institutional Trust Lands ("SITLA") and the BLM 
for the purpose of continuing his cattle business. The Colorado River Land is the land now 
in dispute in the instant case. Tr. Vol. I, at p. 16. 
When the Colorado River Land was purchased by the Appellee, there were no homes 
or any structures on the property. Some time in the 1970's, Appellee's brother decided to 
build a house on the Colorado River Land. Appellee's brother determined to blast the cliffs 
located on the Colorado River Land to make a place to build his desired house. SITLA, 
1
 To avoid confusion, AppeUee refers throughom to the Transcripts in this m ^ ^ 
"Vol. T for uie First Day and First Day - Continued; "Vol. IT as the Second Day of Trial and 
Second Day - Continued; and "Vol. ffl" as the Third Day of Trial. 
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however, was informed that a house was being built on the Colorado River Land and held 
a town meeting where they instructed the Appellee he could not build a house on the 
property. Appellee indicated that there was no house built, but only holes in the mountain. 
Tr. Vol. I at pp. 18-20. 
Over the next several years, Appellee proceeded to purchase the land from SITLA and 
BLM. The process to purchase the Colorado River Land began in 1973. In 1981, Appellee 
completed the purchase of one hundred thirty five (135) acres of the Colorado River Land. 
Tr. Vol. I at p. 21. Appellee made numerous improvements to the Colorado River Land and 
spent a large amount of money and time for said improvements. Specifically, a two (2) story 
structure with a basement was built. This structure contained three (3) bedrooms, five and 
a half bathrooms, a large rumpus room, storage room, a kitchen and a fireplace. Tr. Vol. I 
at p.22. Upon completion of the two story structure, Appellee's brother assisted him in 
blasting out ten (10) rooms in the mountain that would be used as rooms for lodging of 
people in the future. These rooms were painted and carpeted in all different colors. Tr. Vol. 
I at pp.25 and 28. Appellee then built himself a home on the Colorado River Land, which 
was had three (3) bedrooms, a kitchen and two (2) decks connected with a spiral staircase. 
Tr. Vol. I at pp. 33-34. Appellee's ultimate goal was to build a "dude ranch" and have it 
used as a such by paying customers. Therefore, all the necessary finishing work needed for 
the current homes were accomplished, including plumbing, lights, gas, water, electricity, 
cabinets, blinds, curtains, partitions, and more. Tr. Vol. I at p. 36. 
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Appellee also developed and constructed numerous other recreational items, together 
with items of importance to enhancing a dude ranch. More specifically, Appellee built a 
baseball diamond, shooting range, airplane runway, storage units, garden and horse corrals. 
Tr. Vol. I at pp. 39-44. All of these aforementioned improvements were paid for by the 
Appellee. Tr. Vol. I at p. SO. With the hired help of his cousins and as his funds would 
allow, Appellee built three (3) tunnels or drifts, which were fifteen (IS) feet wide, fifteen 
(IS) feet high and sixty to sixty-five (60-65) feet deep connecting each tunnel or drift to the 
others and the lodge for storage for his tools and vehicles. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 26-27. 
Appellant was employed by Appellee at their fencing company from 1972 to 1989. 
Appellee assisted in the improvements on the Colorado River Land; to wit: Appellant built 
two (2) building structures, one as an area for hot tubs and the second encased a two 
thousand (2000) gallon propane tank. Appellee did not pay for these two structures built by 
the Appellant Appellant was paid salary due to his employment at their fencing company. 
Tr. Vol. I at pp. 194 and 196. 
Appellee testified that Appellant was the child that had done more work and shown 
more interest in the ranch than his other children. Tr. Vol. H at pp. 112-113. In 1994, 
Appellant quit his own fencing company to come work for his father full time on the ranch. 
Appellant became worried that the dude ranch would produce a large income and mat his 
siblings would then want and interest in it and would try and take it from him. Appellant 
spoke with Appellee about his concern and Appellee told Appellantthat he would take action 
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to ensure Appellee's siblings could not take his interest in the dude ranch from him. 
Appellee then spoke to his attorneys in Las Vegas, Nevada, who instructed him that he had 
to sign a lease to protect Appellant's interests. Appellee was reluctant to do so, however, the 
attorneys informed him that the Lease was the only way to legally protect Appellant's 
interests. Appellee instructed the attorneys to draft the Lease. 
Appellee testified at the trial in this matter that his understanding of the drafting of 
such a lease was for the purpose of keeping the other children from being able to come in and 
take the ranch from the Appellant. Tr. Vol. I at p. 51-55. Furthermore, he reiterated to 
Rodney what the purpose of the Lease was, that it was a stop gap measure and not a lease 
that will prevent his sibling from taking the ranch from him in the future. Tr. Vol. I at p. 104. 
Moreover, Appellee understood that it was only to be used in the event of his passing away. 
Tr. Vol. I at pp. 105-106. 
Appellant also testified that the purpose of the Lease was to protect him from his 
brothers and sisters and would come into effect only if something happened to his father. Tr. 
Vol. II at pp. 19-20. Appellant additionally testified that, as long as Appellee was living, 
Appellant did not anticipate his siblings attempting to take the ranch. Id. 
The Lease was drafted and signed by both parties on or about February 24,19942. Tr. 
Vol II at p 20. One of the issues in this case is whether the lease was drafted and signed by 
both parties and Appellee's wife in 1992, then modified and signed again inl994. The 
2 
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parties stipulated to the Lease being signed in 1994. Appellee testified that he thought the 
two year discrepancy between when the Lease was drafted to when it was signed is due to 
Appellant coming to work mil time for him on the ranch after quitting the fencing company 
in 1994. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 56-57. Appellee testified that he never gave a copy of mat lease 
to the Appellant and that he kept it with his documents that he moved to a house that 
Appellant was living in when the fencing company was sold. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 55, 57-58. 
Appellee testified that he desired to have Appellant's wife removed from the 
document for personal reasons and that he discussed this wish with Appellant, who was 
present at the signing and did not object to the change. Appellee removed Appellant's wife's 
name from the document and both parties signed the Lease once again. Tr. Vol. I at p. 97-
105. Appellee testified that he did not see the Lease again until the year 2001. On July 19, 
2001, after a falling out with Appellee, Appellant recorded the Lease with the San Juan 
County Recorder. R009. Appellant failed to provide Appellee with a copy of the recorded 
lease. Tr. Vol. I at p. 68. 
Under the terms of the now-recorded Lease, Appellant was to pay rent of $275.00 per 
month to Appellee for a period of 99 years. R010-R011. Appellee had received an offer by 
a third party proposing how they would run the ranch. Appellant was not abiding by the 
terms of the Lease or their verbal agreements, therefore, Appellee hand-delivered a notice 
to Appellant listing items that needed correcting, informing him that the Lease would be 
cancelled on his feilure to do so. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 61-62. Appellant failed to pay any rent 
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money to Appellee, failed to present Appellee with a workable sales plan to bring in 
customers at the ranch, and failed to perform other various tasks required by Appellee. Tr. 
Vol. I at pp. 62-63; Exhibit 25. 
Appellant and his wife testified that they paid Appellee rent payments in cash; 
however, Appellee testified that he had never received any cash payments from Appellant 
Tr. Vol. I at p. 68. Appellant's wife was handling the books for the ranch and had kept 
meticulous records of any and all receipts as to the ranch. Appellant's wife would categorize 
the receipts and checks appropriately for the purpose of her taxes. Appellant's wife testified, 
however, that she witnessed cash transactions occur, but failed to keep any record of when 
Appellant had made cash payments to Appellee. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 105-107. 
Appellee testified that, after turning the fencing company over to Appellant, Appellant 
had to keep his father on the payroll of the fencing company for insurance purposes and, 
therefore, paid Appellee a weekly check of $25.00. Tr. Vol. I at p. 64. Appellee testified that 
he received six (6) checks from Appellant: one check in the amount of sixteen hundred and 
fifty dollars ($1650.00), dated November 13, 2001; one check in the amount of three 
thousand and three hundred dollars ($3300.00) dated January 1, 2002; one check in the 
amount of eighteen thousand nine hundred and seventy-five dollars ($18, 975.00), dated 
March 25, 2002; one check in the amount of two thousand four hundred and seventy-five 
dollars ($2475.00), dated December 30, 2002; and one in the amount of two hundred 
seventy-five ($275.00), dated January 30,2003; and one in the amount of three thousand and 
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twenty-five dollars ($3025.00). (Tr. Vol. I at pp. 75-76; Exhibits 27-32). None of the six 
(6) of these checks were ever deposit into Appellee's account due to insufficient funds in the 
accounts to cover the amounts of the checks. Moreover, bank statements and admissions 
from Appellant also verified that Appellant had insufficient funds to cover the checks written 
to Appellee. Tr. Vol. II at p. 230-232. 
When Appellant's deposition was taken, Appellee counsel asked him what would 
need to be remedied in order to put guests in the facility immediately. Appellant alleged that 
there were three reasons why the ranch was not ready to bring in paying guests. First, 
Appellant indicates that he had a differing opinion as to how the running water for guests 
should be conducted and spent an hour and a half changing the water around. Tr. Vol. II at 
p. 189-190; Tr. Vol. I at p. 28. Second, Appellant alleges there was an electrical issue that 
he felt they needed a larger generator, so he replaced the generator, which he testified was 
not a major repair. Tr. Vol. n at p. 191. Third, Appellant claimed that a grill, stove, 
warming trays and sinks were needed for the kitchen. Tr. Vol. n at p. 192. At the time of 
trial, however, Appellant testified that those were just the ones he mentioned at that time, but 
that there were other reasons. Tr. Vol. II at p. 34. 
Appellant testified that the long term goal and purpose of the lease was to put the 
ranch "into operation." Tr. Vol. II at p. 35. Appellant testified that he had a business license 
from the state of Utah, but testified that he did not have a business license from a local entity. 
Appellant was unable to provide the trial court with any proof of such license, however. 
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Appellant also testified that he does not pay any taxes or have any liability insurance other 
than what is covered by his home owners insurance. Tr. Vol. I at p. 210-212. 
Mr. Ed Tangren ("Ed"), Appellee's brother provided testimony that he assisted 
Appellee prior to 1986 or 1988 with installing all the necessary water pipes, appliances, large 
stoves, steam tables, a dishwasher, fridges, furniture, drapes, carpet, plumbing, a 12-volt 
generator, and wiring. Ed also testified as to having personal knowledge that Appellee and 
his wife were living at the ranch. Tr. Vol. II at p. 66-67. On cross-examination, Ed admitted 
to not knowing anything about the legal code requirements for the rooms in order to rent 
them out on a commercial level. Tr. Vol. II at p. 70. Appellant testified that, after reviewing 
the code, a lot more work would be necessary before the ranch could be opened to the public. 
Tr. Vol. II at p. 235. 
In March of 2002, Appellee counsel reviewed the documents and sent a notice to 
Appellant at the address provided in the Lease, which was returned to counsel after three (3) 
separate delivery attempts of March 23, March 28, and April 9,2002. Tr. Vol. II at p. 165. 
On April 29, 2002, Appellee filed the Complaint in this matter. R002-R019. Appellee 
counsel then sent a letter to Appellant in October of 2002, stating what repairs need to be 
resolved. Appellant failed to respond to said letter. Tr. Vol. II at p. 166; Exhibit 36. As a 
result, Appellee went down to the Colorado River Land to verify whether or not the items 
stated in the October letter had been corrected, of which he found they had not. Tr. Vol. I at 
p. 166. On January 27,2004, Appellee's counsel sent another letter to Appellant, indicating 
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that the Herns requested in previous letter had not been addressed. Tr. Vol. I at p. 166. On 
April 15, 2004 Appellee counsel then drafted and served upon Appellant (at an address 
provided by Appellant in the deposition held March 6,2004) an AmendedNotice of Default 
Appellee's counsel then attempted to deliver the Notice to Appellant on March 29, April 4, 
and April 13, 2003, but such attempts were unsuccessful and the letter was returned to 
Appellee counsel on April 21,2003. Tr. Vol. I at p. 166-167; Exhibits 36 and 43-45). 
Appellant claims that he has spent three hundred and ninety three thousand dollars 
($393,000.00) of personal property to the ranch and made a total income of one hundred 
sixty nine thousand dollars ($169,000.00) over the last ten (10) years in income. Appellants 
tax returns for that time period average about sixteen thousand dollars ($16,000) a year. Tr. 
Vol. I at p. 201-205. When asked how Appellant reached the conclusion of those figures, 
he testified mat he had sold assets to do so. However, the sales and monies were never 
indicated on Appellant's tax returns. Tr. Vol. I at p. 205-207. 
On August 25,2004, and November 17 and 18,2004, the allegations contained in the 
Amended Complaint and the Amended Answer and Counterclaim came for trial before 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan 
County, State of Utah. R127-R134. At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the trial 
court found the Lease to be invalid and, thus, no award was granted to either the Appellant 
or the Appellee at that time. Id The trial court found that it had received sufficient 
information to show that the Lease was never intended to be a valid document unless 
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Appellant was at risk of losing his interests in the ranch to his siblings upon Appellee's 
death. Id., see Tr. Vol. HI at p. 3. The parties were instructed to pay their own attorneys fees 
and costs in this matter. Id. On January 12, 2005, the trial court entered the Order, from 
which Appellant timely appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant failed to properly meet the marshaling requirement as required by UT. R. 
APP. P. 24(a)(9) in their challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and this Court should 
decline to entertain their arguments as such. Alternatively, the evidence was sufficient to 
support the findings of the trial court that the Lease at issue herein was invalid. Additionally, 
the trial court did not err in deeming the Lease at issue in this matter as invalid, and thus not 
a binding contract, in reliance upon extrinsic evidence that supplemented rather than 
contradicted the terms of the Lease. This Court should thus affirm the trial court's Order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LEASE IS NOT A BINDING 
AND VALID CONTRACT 
A. Appellant Failed to Meet the Marshaling Requirement in His Challenge 
to the Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Finding 
that the Lease is not a Valid and Binding Contract. 
UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) states that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Recently, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "[m]arshaling evidence in support of the ultimate finding is a 
prerequisite to a challenge to it." Parduhn v. Bennett. 2005 UT 22,112 P.3d 495. The Utah 
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Supreme Court has also held that "[a] party must marshal all of the evidence supportive of 
the verdict in its opening brief." Harding v. Bell. 2002 III 108,57 V Jil 1093. 
The Utah Supreme Court defined the marshaling requirement, stating that 
"specifically, our marshaling rule requires plaintiffs to 'marshal all the evidence in favor of 
the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings 
of fact'" Save our Schools v. BoardofEduc. Of Salt Lake Citv. 2005 UT 55 IflO, 122 P.3d 
611 citing Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82176,100 P.3d 1177 As the Utah Court of Appeals 
has determined, marshaling is "[a] critical requirement of appellate advocacy" when 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. West Valley f-fty yr ffnskins. 2002 UT App 
223,51P.3d52. 
[TJhe challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the challenger resists, and after constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence 
which must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that court's finding 
resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
M "Marshaled facts in an appellant's brief should correlate particular items of evidence with 
the challenged findings, supporting the findings with all available evidence in the record, and 
only then should appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged findings are clearly 
erroneous." Neelv v. Bennett. 2002 UT App 189,51 P.3d 724, cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603. 
"Parties challenging factual findings must fully embrace the adversary's position and play 
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devil's advocate." Parduhn v. Bennett 2005 UT 22,112 P.3d 495. To successfully marshal 
the evidence,".. .the party must therefore temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully 
embrace the adversary's position." Harding v. Belt 2002 UT 108, 57 P.3d 1093. 
It is clear, and the appellate courts have long held, that the burden of marshaling is on 
the Appellant State v. Martinez. 2002 UT App 126,47 P.3d 115. The Utah Supreme Court 
has articulated the purpose behind this stringent requirement in a recent holding, as follows: 
A proper marshaling of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of 
fact promotes efficiency by avoiding a retrying of the facts and by assisting the 
appellate court in its decision-making and opinion writing, and it promotes 
fairness by requiring that the appellants bear the expense and time of 
marshaling the evidence rather than putting the appellee in the precarious 
position of performing the appellant's work at considerable time and expense. 
Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177, rehearing denied. The burden cannot be 
shifted to the appellee or the appellate court. 
It is important to note that "[a]n appellant challenging an ultimate finding of fact may 
not simply review the evidence presented at trial or re-argue the factual case presented in the 
trial court." Parduhn v. Bennett 2005 UT 22,112 P.3d 495. The Utah Supreme Court has 
specifically indicated that it will decline to address a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence if an appellant fails to meet its burden of marshaling because they ". . .merely 
restate[] or review[] the evidence that supports an alternate finding or a finding contraiy to 
the trial court's established finding of fact." Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 2002 
UT 94,54 P.3d 1177. The Utah Court of Appeals has declined to address a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence when an appellant merely selected facts from trial that were most 
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favorable to its position, then attempted to reargue those facts on appeal. Qhline Corp. v. 
Granite Mill. 84^ V,M u\)2 (Utah App. 1993). "[M]ere reference to where evidence 
supporting verdict can be located does not constitute 'marshaling.'" fftittf ffyrel.W.A r 2002 
UT 127, 63 P,3d 607, cert denied 123 S.Ct 2092, 538 U.S. 1035, 155 L.Ed\2d 1065. 
Additionally, unchallenged findings are assumed to be adequately supported by the record. 
&e.Chenv. Stewart. 2004 UT 82. f 19. 100 P.3d 1177. 
Appellant challenges the trial court's findings pertaining to the validity of the Lease. 
Appellant, however, has failed to properly marshal the evidence under UT. R. APP. P. 
24(aX9) to properly raise such a challenge. Specifically, Appellant has failed to provide this 
Court with all the evidence presented to the trial court, i erery presented evidence most 
favorable to their position rather than the findings, and attempts to reargue the facts before 
this Court. See. Pflrdnhn Wilson and QhUsfi, supra. Appellant has failed to set aside his 
own prejudices and embrace the adversary's position. See, H8JT#lg- supra. The Order 
contains the following findings: 
1
 the center of the dispute was a lease dated in 1992 and apparently signed by 
Richard Tangren, Paula Tangren and Rodney TANGREN. 
.^ There was evidence that Paula Tangren's name had been removed from the 
lease and from the notary certificate and the lease had been resigned and 
notarized in 1994, with the signatures of Richard Tangren and Rodney 
Tangren. 
3. The deletion of Mrs. Tangren's name in 1994 was apparently done without 
Objection of the Defendant 
The lease was recorded in 2001 after a falling out between Richard Tangren 
and Rodney Tangren. 
* From 1992 until the lease was filed in 2001, Richard Tangren had been able 
to come and go from the subject property as he pleased. 
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6. There was disputed testimony as to whether or not the lease was delivered 
when signed in 1992 or 1994, or whether it was delivered prior to being 
recorded in 2001. 
7. The Court believes that where testimony was contradictory, the testimony of 
Richard Tangren was more transparent and, therefore, the Court believed it to 
be more truthful. 
8. The Court finds that the Defendant, and more particularly his wife, was more 
meticulous in the records she kept with regard to expenses or expenditures on 
the ranch property, yet made no record of payments on the lease. Therefore, 
the Court finds that there were no cash payments made for the period of 1992 
through the present. 
9. The Court finds that the lease was prepared at the behest of Richard Tangren, 
that he had advice of counsel with regard to its terms and went against the 
counsel of his attorneys in the execution and content of the lease is an 
indication of his effort to make a concession to Rodney Tangren and that the 
agreement would not come into effect unless there was a quarrel or dispute 
with the Tangren siblings. 
10. The Court finds that based upon the foregoing, the document noted in this 
litigation as the "Lease" was intended as a protection against an incursion upon 
the defendant by his siblings and was not intended to govern actions as 
between Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren and both parties agreed and 
understood that it would only take effect if challenged by Rodney's siblings. 
11. The Court finds that the "Lease" is not a valid document. 
12. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew the "Lease" was not intended as 
a functioning agreement between the Tangren Trust and Defendant and was 
intended to protect Rodney Tangren from incursions or challenges by his 
siblings. 
13. The Court finds that there was no reliance on the lease document as a valid and 
binding lease by Rodney Tangren. 
14. As the court has found the lease to be invalid, there was no requirement to pay 
rent and thereby no rent is due from Rodney Tangren to Richard Tangren. 
15. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew that the agreement was not 
between he and Richard, but was to protect him from his sibling and therefore, 
there was no fraud which induced him or cause any damage to Rodney. 
16. With regard to the Defendant's unjust enrichment claim, the Court does not 
find sufficient evidence to show that he improved the property. The value or 
evidence on expenditures was just to maintain the property and did not 
increase the value of the property. 
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i 7 The Court finds that there was no damage upon Rodney's removal of the 
blinds from the property because there was no evidence mat the value of the 
property was diminished and the carpet may have been replaced. 
i o. the Court finds there was insufficient evidence to determine damages under 
the Defendant's Counterclaims. 
See, Addendum "A." Appellant challenges only findings "9" through " IS'" in their opening 
brief, labeling these findings a demonstration of the trial court's "thought processes." See, 
Appellant's BrUftXpp. 30-31. Findings "1" through "8" and "16" through "18" can thus be 
assumed to be supported by the record in this matter. See, Chen, supra. 
Of importance is the Appellant's concession to findings "7" and "8" which 
specifically provide that the trial court believed that, where testimony was contradictory, the 
testimony of Appellee was more truthful. See, Addendum" A." In finding "7," the trial court 
made a credibility determination, stating that Appellee was more credible than Appellant. 
Appellant has failed to challenge this credibility determination in their opening bin i i 
such, Appellant concedes to the precepts of these findings. 
The Appellant also concedes, through failure to challenge finding "8" that no cash 
payments were made for the period 1992 through the present. In essence, this indicates that 
Appellant did not render payment under the Lease to Appellee since it was Appellant's 
contention that he had made cash payments to Appellee, but they were unrecorded by 
Appellant's wife. Finding "8" shows that Appellant did not rely upon the Lease and did not 
make payments for performance thereof, supportive of findings "9" through "15" respecting 
Appellant's intent in entering into the Lease. 
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As it pertains to the remaining findings of fact, Appellant fails to specifically address 
findings "9" through "15" and meet his burden to marshal every scrap of evidence supportive 
of these trial court findings. Instead, Appellant simply states his version of the facts most 
favorable to his position, rather than taking the adversary's position and attempting to argue 
against such position. This mistaken analysis of the evidence presented is found throughout 
Appellant's Brief, as set forth more particularly below. 
The Appellant's Brief misstates or misconstrues the evidence supporting several 
findings of Appellant throughout. Appellant attempts to mislead this Court, arguing that 
Appellee acknowledged that he received checks from the Appellant, statiog as it pertains to 
Appellee as follows: 
. . .did not attempt to deposit the checks and accordingly received no money 
from the checks. He testified that he did not cash the checks or present them 
for payment at the bank, based upon legal advice....There was testimony that 
some of the checks, if they would have been deposited by the Plaintiff, would 
not have cleared the bank. 
See, Appellant fs Brief at pp. 18-19. Appellant mistakenly ignores critical evidence that was 
presented by Appellee as to the reason he did not present the checks to the bank—because 
there was evidence in the form of bank statements admitted into trial and an admission by 
the Appellant that supports the information provided by Appellee. Tr. Vol, I at pp. 230-232. 
Appellant also fails to address finding "8" pertaining to the trial court's findings that he did 
not make cash payments under the Lease. Appellant simply states the evidence in a light 
most favorable to his position rather than the findings in this matter. 
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The Appellant's Brief discusses how Appellant investigated the state codes that were 
relevant to opening a commercial establishment, specifically stating that "[t]he Defendant 
also investigated state codes that were relevant to opening a commercial establishment and 
determined that a great deal of further improvement was necessary to come into compliance." 
See, Appellant's Brief at p. 7. Appellant, however, fails to marshal the evidence provided by 
Appellee counsel as to his failure to provide proof that he has obtained the legal business 
licenses to ensure its validity as a business, and Appellant's testimony that there were only 
three items that were needed for the ranch to be opened at the time of the deposition in March 
of 2004. 
Appellant discusses how he ran his own fencing compan> .11 id paid his father, the 
Appellee a weekly check. See, Appellant's Brief at p. 8. Appellant fails to cite to any 
indication of that in the record, and fails to provide this court with the evidence that Appellee 
had turned over the fencing company to the Appellant to run and, as a condition of such, had 
to keep his father on the payroll, cutting him a weekly check of only $25.00 per week. Tr 
Vol. I at p. 64. 
Appellant tries to convince this Court to believe that he has given the Appellee money, 
and tried to show how they have not taken advantage of Appellant by never living on the 
ranch and retaining their residence in Las Vegas. However, once again Appellant fails to 
provide this Court with the evidence presented at trial through testimony from Appellee 
himself that the residence they are keeping in Las Vegas belongs to the Appellee. Moreover, 
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not only is the residence the Appellee's, but the Appellee has testified that his son, has never 
paid him rent for that residence either. Tr. Vol. I at p. 69. 
The trial court found that, without any objection at Appellee's bidding, the Lease was 
altered in 1994 to delete Appellant's wife's name. Tr. VoL III at p. 4. Appellant tries to use 
this information to cast a negative light on the Appellee for this Court. Again the Appellant 
fails to address the fact that Appellant did not object to removing his wife's name from the 
Lease, evidenced by the fact that Appellant signed the Lease after Appellee removed her 
name from the lease. 
The trial court found as its first factor that led to its decision that the lease was invalid 
was that both the Appellant and the Appellee testified that the purpose of the lease was to 
protect the Appellant from his siblings. Tr. Vol. Ill at p. 3. This Court was not apprised of 
this information by the Appellant, however, who simply set forth as follows: 
Richard Tangren testified that he told the Defendant at the time the lease was 
signed that the document was a "stop-gap measure" and, that in feet, it was not 
a lease. Later, the Plaintiff testified that he simply told the Defendant that the 
lease would prevent his brother and sisters from ever coming in and forcing 
him from the ranch. He further stated that it was to be used by the people 
running his estate when dead. 
Appellant's Brief at p. 11. The Appellant's Brief fails to assert that, on cross-examination, 
Appellant testified as to his understanding the purpose of the lease was for this exact reason 
that is stated above. Tr. Vol. H at pp. 19-20. 
Appellant informed this Court of the approximate wages earned by the Appellant and 
his wife and how they spent $393,000 on the ranch over a ten year period. Furthermore, 
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Appellant sets forth that he paid cash payments to Appellee of $275.00 per month, from 1992 
until he started paying by check in 2001. Appellant's Brief at p. 16, 18. The evidence 
Appellant fails to provide for this Court is the meticulousness of the Appellant's wife about 
keeping all the receipts and her process for categorizing them for tax purposes, which was 
found by the trial court and relied upon in its determination mat Appellant had not made any 
cash payments to Appellee. See, Order at Addendum "A" ("the fact that despite meticulous 
records of all other expenditures, mere have been no records whatsoever to support the claim 
that rent payments were made under that agreement" See Vol. Ill at p. 4. 
Appellant would also have this Court believe that Appellee was sending letters and 
notices under the Lease to the wrong address since they were sending them to an address that 
was not listed on the Lease. Appellant argues as follows: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff testified to exhibit 41, a letter sent by him to 
Defendant in March of 2002, that was returned by the post office (Tr. Vol. 1, 
165:19 to 166:1; exhibits 41 and 42) He also testified about a letter sent to 
Defendant's counsel, exhibits 43, 44, 45, and 46 (Tr. Vol. 1, 167:3 to 
168:23)..And mat Defendant receives his mail at his post office box. 
{Appellant's Brief, p.21-2213,1) 
Appellant fails to inform this • ourt that, in March of 2002, Appellee counsel reviewed the 
documents and sent a notice to Appellant to the address provided in the Lease, but it was 
returned to counsel after three (3) separate delivery attempts of March 23,2002, March 28, 
2002, and April 9, 2002. Tr. Vol. I at p. 165; Exhibit 41 & 42. Furthermore, Appellee 
counsel then drafted an amended notice of default on April 15,2004, and sent it to Appellant 
at the address he had recently given them at the deposition held March 6,2004. Said notice 
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was then once again attempted to be delivered to Appellant at the new address on March 29, 
2003, April 4,2003, and April 13,2003, but was returned to Appellee counsel on April 21, 
2003. Tr. Vol. I at p. 166-167; Exhibits 36,43-45. 
It is evident that the Appellant has failed to properly marshal the evidence in this 
matter, has only provided this Court with the testimony and evidence most beneficial to their 
position, and has mistakenly attempted to reargue their position on appeal. See, Parduhn. 
Wilson and Ohline. supra. This Court should decline to address Appellants challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence in this matter for Appellant's failure to adequately marshal the 
evidence under UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9). 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Lease Was not a Valid 
and Binding Contract 
Appellant argues that the Lease is valid and binding as a contract because it contains 
the elements of a contract and is fiilly integrated and unambiguous. See, Appellant's Brief 
at pp. 24-33. 
As argued further below, it is clear that recent case law evidences that the trial court 
undertook a proper analysis of the evidence presented at the trial in this matter and that it 
appropriately determined that the Lease was not a valid and binding contract. 
In Gillmor v. Macev, 2005 UT App 351, 121 P.3d 57, this Court undertook an 
extensive analysis of the issues argued by Appellant in his brief and provided some 
guidelines. It provides the following: 
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UnderUtah law, if the initial review of the plain language of a contract, within 
its four comers, reveals no patently obvious ambiguities, the inquiry into 
whether an ambiguity exists in a contract does not always end there. Utah's 
rules of contract interpretation allow courts to consider any relevant evidence 
to determine whether a latent ambiguity exists in contract terms that otherwise 
appear to be unambiguous. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n. 907 
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) ("When determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered.") see also Nielsen v. 
Gold's Qyra, 2003 UT 37 f7, 78 P.3d 600 (stating mat any "[relevant, 
extrinsic evidence 'of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the 
[contract]' is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the contract 
is ambiguous") (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). [FN14] In 
adopting tins approach to the interpretation of contracts and contract 
ambiguities, the Utah Supreme Court has reasoned that "[o]therwise, the 
determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely 
on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and 
experience/ " Ward. 907 P.2d at 268.(citations omitted) Therefore, 
[FN14] In this regard, Utah case law has rejected the strict 
application of the "four corners" rule, which limits the 
boundaries of inquiry into whether an ambiguity exists in a 
contract to the contract's "four corners"and effectively excludes 
the evidence of any surrounding circumstances—outside of the 
writing—that might indicate that the contract language lacks the 
required degree of clarity. See, e.g. Oakwood Vill L.L.C. v. 
Albert*nn% ffr., 2004 UT 10 1(17, 104 P.3d 1226 (typifying 
application of "four corners" rule of contract analysis when 
written instrument is unambiguous and complete). See generally 
2 E. Allen Farnsworth, Famsworth on Contracts, §§ 7.12-7.12a 
(2d ed.2001) (explaining the four corners rule and the varying 
degrees of stringency with which it is applied by state courts). 
Likewise, Utah no longer strictly applies the "parol evidence 
rule" or the "plain meaning rule," which exclude the use of any 
parol evidence to show whether a contract's language lacks the 
required degree of clarity. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
AssX 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995) ("While there is Utah case 
taw that espouses a stricter application of the [parol evidence] 
rule and would restrict a determination of whether ambiguity 
exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of the terms of 
the writing itself; [see, e.g. Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel. 
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Inc.. 2002 UT 62 f l6 , 52 P.3d 1179 the better-reasoned 
approach is to consider the writing in light of the surrounding 
circumstances.11). See generally 2 Farnsworth § 7.12; 5 Margaret 
N. Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.7 (rev. ed.1998) 
(discussing the various views courts have on how the parol 
evidence and plain meaning rules should be applied in contract 
interpretation). Instead, Utah law has made these rules of 
interpretation just part of the initial inquiry to determine whether 
an ambiguity exists in contract language. They are no longer the 
determinative rules they once were when parties asserted that a 
contract contained ambiguities. See See Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); Nielsen v. 
Gold's Gvm. 2003 UT 37,17, 78 P.3d 600. 
[although the terms of an instrument may seem clear to a particular reader-
including a judge—this does not rule out the possibility that the parties chose 
the language of the agreement to express a different meaning. A judge should 
therefore consider any credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention. 
Id. See also Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at f 7, 78 P.3d 600. Thus, a " f[r]ational 
interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible 
evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties ... so that the court can 
"place itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the 
time of contracting."f " Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (second alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). 
Ibid.dX*h35. 
In the instant matter, the trial court found that the Lease was not a valid document as 
governing actions between Appellant and Appellee. See, Addendum "A." The trial court 
found that Appellant knew that the Lease was not intended as a functioning agreement 
between Appellee and himself. Id. The trial court additionally found that, based upon this 
knowledge, there was no reliance upon the Lease by Appellant, and, therefore, Appellant was 
not defrauded by it Id, see also Tr. Vol. Ill at p. 8. It was found that, since the Lease was 
invalid, there was no agreement to pay rent nor any rent owing Appellee. Id. Appellant does 
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not dispute that evidence supporting these findings was presented to die trial court, but 
argues that this evidence was mistakenly relied upon, rather than UV provisions of the 
contract, in determining the validity of the Lease. 
Extrinsic evidence is defined as "[e]vidence relating to a contract but not appearing 
on the face of the contract because it comes from other sources, such as statement between 
the parties or the circumstances surrounding the agreement." Black's Law Dictionary, 2d 
Pocket Ed. "extrinsic evidence," p. 251. In the instant case, the Lease itself does not 
specifically state its purpose; however, both parties clearly testified to their understanding 
of its purpose, suiting that it was a protection for the Appellant in the event that his siblings 
attempt to take the ranch from him upon Appellee's death. In the instant case, the trial court 
had to consider extrinsic evidence based upon the fact that unusual circumstances existed in 
the inception of the Lease, such as the relationship between the parties, changes that were 
made original lease, greements and understandings that were 
communicated between the Appellant and Appellee that were not indicated in the Lease 
itself. To argue that the trial court may not rely upon this extrinsic evidence in its 
determination is to deny the trial court the opportunity to place itself in the same situation in 
which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting. See, ffifoinor. supra. 
The Appellant argues that the trial court must first determine whether the writing was 
intended by the parties to be an integration. Appellant argues that the preliminary question 
is whether the writing was intended by the parties to be a final and complete expression of 
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the agreement, but relies only upon the provisions of the contract for their position. It is 
clear, however, that extrinsic evidence was necessary in this consideration since both 
Appellant and Appellee testified that the written agreement was not intended to be a binding 
agreement unless certain circumstances arose-Appellee's death and Appellant's siblings 
attempting to take the ranch from Appellant. Appellant concedes that, in resolving the 
preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence is admissible. See, 
Appellant Brief at p. 27, %2. It is axiomatic that the evidence presented on the parties' intent 
in entering into the Lease is relevant to this matter; however, Appellant fails to address the 
extrinsic evidence offered and relies only upon the provision of the contract. This Court 
recognized the need for a court to consider this relevant extrinsic evidence when it stated that 
" . . . a [Rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible 
evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties...so that the court can 'place itself in the 
same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting.'" Gillmor 
v.Macev. 2005 UT App 351 f35,121 P.3d 57 citing Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 atf7,78 R3d 600; 
see also Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (citations omitted) 
Appellant also asserts that the trial courts decision to deem the Lease invalid is 
contrary to Utah law, but relies only upon law which has been superceded in part by Gillmor 
to indicate that parol evidence cannot alter or modify the written terms of the contract See 
Appellant's Brief atpp. 30-33. Specifically, Appellant cites to Kimball v. Campbell, a 1985 
Utah Supreme Court case, and Seashores Inc. V. Hancev, a 1987 case from this Court. 
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GJUmoj clearly states that "Utah no longer strictly applies the 'parol evidence rule' or the 
'plain meaning rule,' which exclude the use of any parol evidence to show whether a 
contract's language lacks the required degree of clarity." Ibid at 135. Qillmox instead 
indicated that a consideration of all evidence surrounding inception of the contract is a more 
rational interpretation of the preliminary issues, such as integration. Appellant has failed to 
show how the trial court's determination that the Lease was invalid was contrary to Utah law 
since consideration of all evidence, including parol evidence, allows for a more rational 
interpretation as was undertaken by the trial court in this matter. 
Appellant continues to claim that the trial court inappropriately relied upon 
Appellant's testified intent behind entering into the Lease rather than the provisions of the 
Lease itself to: detennine that the Lease was not a valid and binding contract Again, 
Appellant fails to indicate to mis Court that he himself conceded in his testimony that 
was also his belief and intent in entering the contract. The trial court did not rely upon only 
Appellant's testified intent, but rather recognized mat there was no dispute between the 
parties as to the intent in entering into the Lease and that such evidence was relevant to the 
consideration of the matter. 
Appellant concedes mat ". . .parol evidence not inconsistent with the writing is 
admissible to show what the entire r< >nh urt really was, by supplementing, as distinguished 
from contradicting the writing." See, Appellant's Briefatp. 32, w/ftiy Wehh v. R.O.A. Gen.. 
[Ok, 804 ?2d 547.551 (Utah App. 1991). Appellant argues that the determination by the 
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trial court that the testified intent of both parties in this matter causes the Lease to be invalid 
is evidence of a contradiction with the provisions of the Lease, but does not specifically 
indicate in what manner. See, Appellant's Brief at pp. 31-32. The fact that the parties 
intended the contract to be in force if certain requirements were met does not contradict the 
terms of the contract, but supplements it with the intent of the parties in entering into it. 
Appellant wanted assurance that his siblings would not be able to take the ranch from him 
if Appellee passed away, so he asked Appellee to draft the Lease to protect his interests. 
Appellee did so at the request of his son, recognizing the efforts his son had made towards 
the ranch. When the relationship became strained, however, Appellant took advantage of 
Appellee's prior generosity and recorded the Lease. The recording of the Lease sparked the 
controversy leading to the filing of the action in this matter. The intent of the parties was as 
important a part of the Lease as any of the written provisions and does not contradict any of 
its express terms. Appellant ironically challenges that the trial court altered or modified the 
terms of the contract, but technically Appellant did so when he decided to record the Lease 
contrary to the intent of the parties in executing it. 
H. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER ARE SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE DETERMINATION THAT 
THE LEASE WAS INVALID. 
Appellant takes issue with the trial court's process of determination, indicating that 
the trial court failed to meet its duty to articulate its determination if the Lease met the basic 
requirements of an enforceable contract, failed to articulate the presumptions created in the 
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case that the Lease is fully integrated, and failed to articulate its determination whether the 
parol evidence was being accepted for purposes of augmenting the terms of the Lease. See, 
Appellant's Brief & pp. 34-36. Utah law, however, indicates as follows: 
In cases in which factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by the 
trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, the reviewing court 
assumes that the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision, and the 
court will affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to 
find facts to support it, but if the ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption 
unreasonable, however, the reviewing court will remand for a new trial. 
State v.Tson. 2006 UT 26, Tf45, -P.3d-. Appellant fails to undertake an appropriate analysis 
of the findings and thus, mistakenly takes issue with these matters when they are clearly dealt 
with in the Order and supported by competent evidence presented at the trial in this 
First, the trial court's alleged "duty" to determine if the Lease met the basic 
requirements of an enforceable contract is addressed in the Order and supported by adequate 
evidence presented. Appellant fails to cite any authority for the contention that the trial court 
has some kind of "duty" in this regard; however, the Order does address such a 
determination. Evidence was sufficiently presented by both the Appellant and the Appellee 
at the trial in this matter respecting whether the I^ase was a vaUd and bmdmg contract It 
can be presumed that the trial court was thus aware of the evidence both supporting that it 
was or was not a valid and binding contract and considered the elements of a contract 
preliminarily in its decision. The Lease was presented as an Exhibit at the trial, and is the 
best evidence for such basic requirements. 
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Such an analysis can also be presumed by its ultimate findings respecting the issue. 
Finding "1" recognizes and acknowledges that "[t]he center of the dispute was a lease dated 
in 1992 and apparently signed by Richard Tangren, Paula Tangren and Rodney TANGREN." 
Finding "11" states that "[t]he Court finds that the "Lease" is not a valid document. Finding 
"12" states that the Lease "was not intended as a functioning agreement between the Tangren 
Trust and Defendant." Finding "13" states that "there was no reliance on the lease document 
as a valid and binding lease." It is clear that the trial court acknowledged or at least 
considered the essential elements of the Lease under the Statute of Frauds. 
Second, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to render findings respecting the 
"presumptions created in the case that the Lease is fully integrated." See, Appellant fs Brief 
at p. 35. Since the trial court found that the Lease was not a valid and binding document, 
however, a determination as to its integration would be unnecessary since integration is a 
determination as to the validity of the contract itself. Alternatively, evidence was presented 
and findings were entered which indicate that the trial court adequately considered the 
integration concept. As Appellant concedes, the Lease itself contains what they term an 
"integration clause." Id; See, Exhibit "2" to Appellant's Brief dX p. 6. The Lease was 
entered as an exhibit and relied upon by the trial court in its determination. Additionally, as 
argued supra, the determination as to the integration of a contract allows for extrinsic and 
parol evidence to be presented for such a determination. The findings adequately support the 
trial court's analysis of extrinsic and parol evidence pertaining to the testified intention of 
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both parties involved in mis matter. Findings "9" through "15" adequately set forth the 
evidence offered and the trial court's determination as to the integration of the Lease, by 
declining to recognize it as valid and binding under contract law. 
Third, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to articulate its determination 
whether the parol evidence was being accepted for purposes of augmenting the terms of the 
Lease. Again, since the Lease was found to be invalid, it is unclear whether an undertaking 
by the trial court as to the parol evidence offered was necessary since the trial court did not 
alter the terms of the Lease. The evidence presented and the findings once again support the 
fact that the trial court adequately considered that the extrinsic evidence was for the purpose 
of explaining the intent behind the Lease. As argued supra, the trial court simply 
supplemented the Lease with information respecting the place in which the parties found 
themselves at the time of contracting, so the trial court could undertake a more rational 
interpretation of the provisions of the Lease. See, Q^hBQL at J 35. Findings "9" through 
"15" adequately set forth the extrinsic evidence provided and considered by the trial court 
Appellant's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in this matter clearly fall 
short of the marshaling requirement contained in UT. R. APP. P. 24(aX°) and fail to 
adequately show how the Order is insufficient to a finding that the Lease is invalid. This 
Court should decline to address Appellant's sufficiency challenge and affirm the Order. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 
affirming the Order entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court in this matter. 
Dated this day of May, 2006. 
CRAIG C. HALLS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Appellee 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
F,LED
 JAN 1 2 2005 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BV_ 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, 
by RICHARD TANGREN, TRUSTEE and 
RICHARD TANGREN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. 0207-46 
RODNEY TANGREN, 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on 
the 25th day of August, 2004. Plaintiff Richard Tangren, 
individually and as trustee, was present and represented by Craig 
C. Halls; Defendant Rodney Tangren was present and represented by 
Matthew Jube. This trial was suspended at the close of the first 
day of testimony and the parties returned on the 17th day of 
November, 2004, and the balance of the testimony was received by 
the court; both parties were present and represented by counsel 
as above stated. The Court having received all of the evidence 
1 
and having observed all of the witnesses, taken their testimony 
and reviewed the exhibits, now makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The center of the dispute was a Lease dated in 1992 and 
apparently signed by Richard Tangren, Paula Tangren and Rodney 
Tangren. 
2. There was evidence that Paula Tangren's name had been 
removed from the lease and from the notary certificate and the 
lease had been resigned and notarized in 1994, with the 
signatures of Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren. 
3. The deletion of Mrs. Tangren's name in 1994 was 
apparently done without objection of the Defendant. 
4. The Lease was recorded in 2001 after a falling out 
between Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren. 
5. From 1992 until the lease was filed in 2001, Richard 
Tangren had been able to come and go from the subject property as 
he pleased. 
6. There was disputed testimony as to whether or not the 
lease was delivered when signed in 1992 or 1994, or whether it 
was delivered prior to being recorded in 2001. 
7. The court believes that where testimony was 
contradictory, the testimony of Richard Tangren was more 
2 
transparent and, therefore/ the Court believed it to be more 
truthful. 
8. The Court finds that the Defendant, and more 
particularly his wife, was more meticulous in the records she 
kept with regard to expenses or expenditures on the ranch 
property, yet made no record of payments on the lease. 
Therefore, the Court finds that there were no cash payments made 
for the period of 1992 through the present. 
9. The Court finds that the lease was prepared at the 
behest of Richard Tangren, that he had advice of counsel with 
regard to its terms and went against the advice of counsel. The 
Court finds that his actions against the counsel of his attorneys 
in the execution and content of the lease is an indication of his 
effort to make a concession to Rodney Tangren and that the 
agreement would not come into effect unless there was a quarrel 
or dispute with the Tangren siblings. 
10. The Court finds that based upon the foregoing, the 
document noted in this litigation as the "Lease" was intended as 
a protection against an incursion upon the Defendant by his 
siblings and was not intended to govern actions as between 
Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren and both parties agreed and 
3 
understood that it would only take effect if challenged by 
Rodney's siblings. 
11. The Court finds that the "Lease" is not a valid 
document. 
12. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew the "Lease" 
was not intended as a functioning agreement between the Tangren 
Trust and Defendant and was intended to protect Rodney from 
incursions or challenges by his siblings. 
13. The Court finds that there was no reliance on the lease 
document as a valid and binding lease by Rodney Tangren. 
14. As the Court has found the lease to be invalid, there 
was no requirement to pay rent and thereby no rent is due from 
Rodney Tangren to Richard Tangren. 
15. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew that the 
agreement was not between he and Richard, but was to protect him 
from his siblings and therefore, there was no fraud which induced 
him or caused any damage to Rodney. 
16. With regard to the Defendant's unjust enrichment claim, 
the Court does not find sufficient evidence to show that he 
improved the property. The value or evidence on expenditures was 
just to maintain the property and did not increase the value of 
the property. 
4 
17. The Court finds that there was no damage upon Rodney's 
removal of the blinds from the property because there was no 
evidence that the value of the property was diminished and the 
carpet may have been replaced in any event. 
18. The Court finds that there was insufficient evidence to 
determine damages under the Defendant's Counterclaims. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The claim of Richard Tangren for rents is denied and no 
sum is awarded therefor. 
2. The counterclaim of Rodney Tangren for unjust enrichment 
is denied and no sum is awarded therefor. 
3. The claim of Rodney Tangren for specific performance is 
denied and no sum is awarded therefor. 
4. The claim of Rodney Tangren for reliance damages is 
denied and no sum is awarded therefor. 
5. The claim of Rodney Tangren for fraud is denied and no 
sum is awarded therefor. 
6. The Defendant may remove his personal property from the 
premises and shall have six months, until May 18, 2005, to remove 
said property or the same shall be forever forfeited. 
7. Any items which have become fixtures to the property 
shall remain on the property. 
5 
8. Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and 
attorney fees incurred in pursuance of this action. 
DATED this [2$U day of jAwU&>v*i 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form 
and content: 
MATTHEW JUBE 
Attorney for Defendant 
IT £UDGE 4 — ^ ^ 
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8. Each of the parties shell pay their own costs and 
attorney fees incurred in pursuance of this action. 
DATED this day of . 2005. 
BY THE COURT! 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
JUBI 
Attorney for Defendant 
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